Moscow Observer

an article dedicated to OMON in a Moscow-based “expat” paper “The Exile”.

Today on Novodevichy cemetery in Moscow is a burial ceremony of the first President of Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin.
Attempts to associate the certain time with prominent figures of recently deceased is a common approach in journalism. In case of Boris Yeltsin it is not an overstatement to say that he has to a large extent defined Russia during the volatile 90’s. Yeltsin will go down into the history books as Russia’s ultimate liberal ruler and a westernizer.

When aksed in 1993 which deed is he most proud of in his entire life, he said it was quitting the Communist Party, where he has successfully started his political career. Yeltsin wanted to be the opposite of what the communists were - he has performed a number of difficult reforms; particularly difficult and painful was the rapid transition from planned to market economy. He has liberated the press and was very tolerant to criticism from the outside. He has diminished the role of the KGB in public life and worked towards the creation civil society, manifesting itself through public participation in political processes that went on in the country.

Lots of reforms went wrong, the failed privatisation, as a result of which few became rich practically overnight, whereas the rest of the people felt they were cheated. The Chechen wars dragged on as a senseless bloodbath and a neverending partisan war, accompanied by terrorist acts on Russian territory. Due to these and other problems, Yeltsin was never particularly loved by the majority of Russia’s population. His alcoholism and countless anecdotes of his drinking-related failures on the international scene also did not add to his popularity.

As Gwynne Dyer stated:

I have seen President Boris Yeltsin drunk and I’m pretty sure I have seen him sober, but unless he does something obvious like singing or falling over, it takes a while to decide: both his body language and his speech patterns tend to blur the issue.

Perhaps, the main mistake that he has made in his life was annointing Putin as his direct successor. In retrospective, that was the one single deed that has overturned most of Yeltsin’s unquestionable political achievements.

Putin’s policies have largely destroyed what was left of Yeltsin’s political achievement. While Yeltsin was an innovator seeking to create and nurture a free Russia with public participation and a limited role for the state, Putin scrapped the fledgling institutions and political freedoms and pushed Russia back toward its traditional track: loyal bureaucrats instead of statesmen; and an omnipotent and forbidding state and an impotent society, deeply alienated from each other.

Masha Lipman in Washington Post, on Yeltsin’s legacy

In his last speech, Yeltsin said: “I want to say that I am sorry. I am sorry for the dreams that did not materialize.” The dreams of the young Russian democracy were his dreams too. He was a truly Dostoyevsky’s character, torn apart by various conflicting forces, feeling guilty for his inability to make system improvements. Both his strengths and weaknesses seemed blown out of proportion.

When prominent politicians die many say that they have marked a certain era. In this case I could not agree more.

This weekend the members of “Drugaya Rossiya” (The Other Russia) have organised two more protest marches, yestersay in Moscow in today in St.Petersburg. The first event was largely undermined by the police’s special forces (OMON). As a result, two of the organisers: Garry Kasparov and Alexander Ryklin (editor of the Online Daily Journal) were arrested and charged with breaching administrative norms and fined 1000 roubles (equivalent of $40).

It is likely that the participants of the event scheduled for today in St.Petersburg will see a similar outcome. Reluctance of local administrations to grant permissions for such actions result in illegitimate protests, which then are met with force. What is surprising in this situation is that such displays of civil protest keep arising on a regular basis depsite the fact that they generate relative little publicity. Active social position of these people at times when all the power is centralized indicates growing concern with the current state of affairs among the city “intelligentsia”.

Realistically, the chances of anything being changed as a result of such protests is slim to none, but the timing of mounting dissatisfactions is crucial. It is less than one year before the new presidential elections. This to a large extent explains the paranoya such protests are causing among those in power.

( Фото: Константин Куцылло, Reuters) (Photos: Konstantin Kutsyllo, Reuters)

Among the very few displays opposition’s existence can be seen in ongoing attempts from a coalition of independent non-conformist politicians “The Other Russia” (Drugaya Rossiya) to organise marches of protest. The main objective of the organisation lies in pursuit of fair State Duma elections of 2007 and the upcoming presidential elections of 2008. Among the most prominent members of the movement are former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, former minister of finance Mikhail Kasyanov and a liberal politician Irina Khakamada. The most important strategic goal of the coalition is nomination of a single candidate from the opposition in order to avoid the “Successor” scenario.

This appears to be an overly ambitious goal, considering that there is no effective way to reach the electorate in the nearly fully controlled Russian media environment. In fact, all the state channels are either ignoring the existence of the coalition or hinting at Western sponsorship of the movement. It is implied that no attempt to change the government can result in anything other than ongoing political chaos. An example of such scenario is the current constitutional crisis in Ukraine. It came as a blessing for Kremlin’s propagandists, who continuously argue about the excalating threat of “Orange plague” on Russian soil (stemming from the famous Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 in Ukraine).

Despite the relatively little publicity that the opposition’s marches are receiving, the public attendance are steadily growing in numbers. On the 16th of December 2006 about 4 thousand people gathered in Moscow, on the 3rd of March 2007 in St.Petersburg between 5 and 7 thousand people attended the meeting. Both events were accompanied by state police and police special forces, outnumbering the demonstrators. Furthermore, the event scheduled on March 24th in Nizhniy Novgorod was denied on the spot, resulting in arrest of nearly 300 people, while the organisers were charged as terrorists.

This is one of the examples of administrative overreaction, as the real impact of such protests can not possibly have such distructive effect on the system. In fact, Kasparov and his peers are mainly perceived as marginalised idealists, fighting a battle that can not possibly be won. The worrying factor lies in local administrations’ inability to evaluate the potential effect of such meetings, which is rather insignificant in the framework of battle for the mind of the electorate. Goliath isn’t scared of David, he is just overly cautious..

A short and precise article in The Guardian Online concerning the “Successor Project”.

The last week has brought a new landmark in this year’s politcal situation. The head of Russia’s Central Electoral Committee Alexander Veshnakov will no longer be a member of the Committee, as his name was not on the list of the five members proposed by President Putin. In reality that means that the head of Russia’s electoral system, who is known for his loyal pro-Putin politcal orientation, is being replaced by another, most probably even more loyal Kremlinist.

A number of liberal journalists have accused Alexander Veshnyakov of forging the electioal results of 2000 in order to avoid the second round of the elections. Allegedly, during the last hours of calculations the support of presidential candidate Putin has grown to nearly 100%. However, due to a lack of transparency in the electoral process these accusations can not be verified.
Even more alarming were other displays of subjectivity during electoral processes. A recent example of that would be the results of the draw, which was to determine the order in which political parties appear on the ballot sheet. In 8 out of 14 regions, where the results were supposed to be random and independent from each other, the ruling party “Edinaya Rossiya” (United Russia) received the first place in the ballot sheets. Accoring to theory, a probability of such outcome equals just 0.033%. This is a brilliant illutration to what is being referred to as “administrative resource”, or the ability of the local authorities’ to influence the electoral process on the spot.

Despite of being a pro-Putin man, Alexander Veshnyakov had a contrasting personal viewpoints on a number of new legislative initiatives proposed (and partially already passed) by the state Duma and it’s largest representative - “Edinaya Rossiya”. These include elimination of a required minimum voter turnout, re-introduction of voting ahead of time (known as a big lever for manipulation via the administrative resource), and others. It appears as if the Kremlin wants to re-ensure its control over the electoral process just in time for the upcoming Duma elections of 2007 and, most importantly, the presidential elections due in 2008.

The most notable event on Russia’s political landscape is the fact that the defense minister Sergey Ivanov has been promoted to the position of the first vice president. This appointment did not come as a surprise to many, as Mr. Ivanov is seen as one of the two likeliest candidates for the next presidency. As of right now both main contenders for the position - Dmitriy Medvedev and Sergey Ivanov - are serving “first vice-presidents”.

At the moment it appears as if Putin himself is not sure which one of the two should inherit the power. If both candidates will run for the presidency in 2008, Putin can free himself from the responsibility to pick between his close associates, and let the people of Russia decide instead. Thus, there is a prospect of Russia having an almost democratic election in terms of equal access of the candidates to the administrative resources. The only problem with such “sovereign democratic” approach lies in the fact that both competing individuals are appointed by and therefore are answerable to the same person. However, most of the representatives of the Russian liberal media do not believe even in such remote possibility of anything being left to chance, as it would be in case of a real election. Instead, they expect that Mr. Putin makes up his mind and conveys his position to the general public shortly prior to the electoral campaigns.

The new appointment of Sergey Ivanov can only be seen in connection with the “successor” project. Expectedly, Putin has equalized the positions of his two main candidates. Polls show that public support for the two 1st vice presidents Medvedev and Ivanov is about even. The power struggle is far from being over, the Moscow Observer will keep commenting on further development of the situation.

One of the essential objectives of Russia’s foreign policy lies in retaining influence in the post-Soviet territories, which are now independent since the collapse of the Union in 1991. Among these, the Baltic states: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia seek to eradicate any connection with Russia, joining the European Union and NATO. Most of the remaining republics became members of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a politically loose association undergoing gradual decline since the day it was established. Through the CIS Russia was looking to preserve its control over these territories by means of economic subsidiaries (for example in the form of cheaper energy supplies) in exchange for political loyalty from other member states. This concept has proved impossible in the long term; as a result of revolutions Georgia and Ukraine have chosen a far more Westernized course of development.

The situation with Belarus has traditionally been completely different. Instead of seeking integration into European structures, President Lukashenko’s main political objective has been revolving around close ties with Russia. There are at least two major reasons for that: firstly, after the widely disputed referendum held in 2004 (that effectively abolished limitations on presidential terms as specified in the constitution) Lukashenko has little contact with the West, which perceives him as an illegitimate ruler. Secondly, up to 40% of Belorussian budget is owed to Russia’s subsidized energy supply. Businesses may not be able to stay competitive in case they have to pay full price for oil and gas.

Russia and Belarus have made integration efforts - to much popular support on both sides due to nostalgia for the Soviet era. To the current Russian political elites it meant that Putin could stay in power for 8 more years, as the newly created country would could provide such an opportunity. Until the end of 2003 both countries were preparing this procedure, the Russian ruble was intended to be the only currency in both countries starting January 2005. To much surprise, Lukashenko then stated that he will now allow Belarus being demoted to being just a region in a bigger political unit. As most of commentators agree, this decision was dictated not as much by the national interest, as by personal political ambitions of Mr. Lukashenko, whose role would significantly diminish upon the unification.

As the union with Belarus bears no more political significance, Russia has decides to abandon subsidies to its former close ally. After a long and difficult negotiations the new formula of economic cooperation was agreed upon. It is a compromise that does not fully suit neither side, but a blow to Belarus’ economic stability may turn out to be severe. In the aftermath of the unsatisfying agreements president Lukashenko is threatening to revise the priorities of Belarus’ foreign policy. This implies a more pro-Western attitude, under the condition that the Europe accepts Belarus as it is at the moment.
Reuters:

Alexander Lukashenko told Reuters in a rare interview on Tuesday there was no question of agreeing to the EU’s “impossible demands” on free media, fair elections and the rule of law set last year as a condition for improving relations.

Lukashenko, in power since 1994 and accused by the EU and the United States of rigging elections, jailing opposition figures and shutting down dissident media, offered little prospect of change to his uncompromising style of government.

Kommersant:

In yesterday’s interview, however, Mr. Lukashenko slipped up by saying that he is ready to be friendly to the West only if he retains his grip on the reins of power. “Thus far, all of the demands made on Belarus have eventually been about how we should destroy our political system, and it is implied that the current president is illegitimate and should leave his post. What right does the West have to demand that?”

This requirement on Lukashenko’s side keeps the prospects of Europe-Belarus future cooperation dubious. It may, however, not even be the initial purpose. A more likely explanation lies in hopes that the Kremlin might want reconsider its current stand and keep one of the very few international allies. But whatever the intention is, it seems very unlikely that this rare display of Lukashenko’s openness to foreign press will bear fruit.

Yesterday the infamous YUKOS trial has taken a brand new turn. Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his business associate Platon Lebedev were charged additionally with theft of 23 billion dollar worth of oil. The charges were brought up in a provincial city of Chita accompanied by severe security measures. As described by Kommersant: “Swarms of police closed streets and intersections leading to the regional persecutor’s headquarters in the center of the city. Machinegun-bearing special forces troops in masks and helmets surrounded the building.” The new accusations could result in up to additional 15 years of prison sentence.
The allegations have caused criticism from various international sources. For instance, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Sean McCormack has commented that:

“…the continued prosecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the dismantlement of Yukos raise serious questions about the rule of law in Russia. Khodorkovsky and his associate, Platon Lebedev, would have been eligible to apply for parole this year, having served half of their terms. These new charges would likely preclude their early release. Many of the actions in the case against Khodorkovsky and Yukos have raised serious concerns about the independence of courts, sanctity of contracts and property rights, and the lack of a predictable tax regime. The conduct of Russian authorities in the Khodorkovsky Yukos affair has eroded Russia’s reputation and confidence in Russian legal and judicial institutions. Such actions as this and other cases raise questions about Russia’s commitment to the responsibilities which all democratic, free market economies countries embrace.“

The main focus of many commentators in connection with these allegations is on the parole that Khodorkovsky could receive later this year, making him eligible to run for the next presidential elections. As Robert Amsterdam, one of Khodorkovsky’s advocates put it for The Independent: “Russia faces crunch parliamentary elections later this year and a presidential ballot in 2008. The Kremlin would not want to see a politically active Khodorkovsky released.”

However unconvincing the charges may seem and however little political impact Khodorkovsky’s release could have, it is obvious that it is in the presidential administration’s interest to keep the ex-oligarch in imprisoned. Regardless of which scenario of presidential power handover will be eventually chosen, politically active Khodorkovsky would be an small element of unpredictability - something that the Kremlin can not allow.

On the 1st of February President Putin held a press-conference in Kremlin. It has been the longest conference to date (3.5 hours) and had over a thousand approved journalist participants. The event was long awaited, as it was assumed that Mr. Putin could name his successor in the course of the discussion. The question of who might that be and where Mr. Putin sees himself after delegation of power were the two hotly debated topics in the forerun to the conference. Much to journalists’ dismay, though in line with his style, President Putin has not provided direct answers. Furthermore, on the question concerning his successor, he stated that “there will be no successors, there will be candidates for the post of president of Russia”. It is not yet clear whether that means that Russia will see a real democratic election. In seems possible that Putin really decides to stay above the battle and leave a number of candidates for the public to choose from. In that case the question of whose side the state television takes would be of critical importance. On the whole, however, such scenario is not considered among the likeliest.

What adds to ambiguity President’s words is the following statement made a few minutes later. “I am also a citizen of Russian Federation, and I reserve a right to express my preferences [concerning presidential candidates]. But I will only do that during the electoral campaign.” It is obvious that naming the next leader of the country now would make Putin a “lame duck” president, with his power gradually fading away. Hence it is in Putin’s interest to keep his options open. This may not suit the rest of the political establishment that seeks to retain its influence and financial resources after 2008 as well. This mounts pressure on Putin to make up his mind, but he is determined to hold on to all his cards.

Nothing was said regarding the role Putin assigns to himself after the next presidential election, other than: “Foremost I see myself [after 2008] as a human being”. As this comment adds no clarity to the subject, speculators are likely to continue predicting a wide spectrum of his potential post-presidential occupations - ranging from Gazprom’s board of directors to head of state Duma. Little more credibility to the latter version can be found in the following statement: “Governing bodies have to be formed in a particular way at the end of 2007 - beginning of 2008. I am thinking about it.”

All that being said, the conference did not bring any qualitatively new information. Despite the unprecedented scale of the meeting, Putin has once more demonstrated his ability to reveal little about what is on his mind. On the brighter side, it indicates that so far the situation is far from its resolution. The Moscow Observer will keep an open eye on the decisive upcoming year.